Reported from the source

Quick summary: German Chancellor Merz, who aimed for a leading role in Europe, has demonstrated self-confidence but faced significant hurdles in recent EU negotiations. His push to utilize frozen Russian state assets for Ukraine was met with strong resistance, ultimately leading to the adoption of a French-led alternative plan. Similarly, efforts to finalize the Mercosur trade agreement, strongly advocated by Germany, were postponed due to Italian intervention. Analysts characterize Merz’s style as assertive, often presenting ideas without extensive prior consultation, and suggest he needs to better engage smaller member states and coalition partners to solidify his influence.

German Chancellor Merz had significant ambitions upon taking office, aiming to assume a leadership role in Europe. While he has succeeded in some areas, the recent summit in Brussels has raised doubts about his effectiveness. A veteran French correspondent, observing Brussels affairs for decades, remarked in the Council building’s canteen, “Your Chancellor is getting a lesson today. He’s being shown how Europe works,” to a relatively new German colleague. Friedrich Merz is often referred to domestically as a “Foreign Chancellor,” comfortable on the international stage. One of his primary goals was to restore Germany’s prominence on the international stage and assert its leadership claim in Europe. The Chancellor publicly championed the use of frozen Russian state assets in Europe for an interest-free loan to Ukraine, announcing a 180-degree shift in Germany’s position in a Financial Times op-ed over the summer. This move was reportedly labeled “German betrayal” by Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever, as reported by the Brussels daily Le Soir, given that the majority of frozen assets are held by Euroclear in Brussels. **The Failure of the “Merz Method”** For months, heads of state and government, along with finance and foreign ministers, debated how approximately 210 billion euros of the Russian central bank’s “immobilized assets” could be made available to Ukraine. Berlin’s key ally, the European Commission, developed a proposal to lend 90 billion euros to Ukraine over two years, with repayment to Russia only if the aggressor covered war damages, thus avoiding outright confiscation. The Chancellery defended this proposal as virtually indispensable. However, while the German government and Commission expected Belgium to eventually concede, De Wever set conditions for his approval: financial guarantees that were unlimited in both amount and duration. These demands were unacceptable not only to usual skeptics like Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic but also to crucial large states such as Italy and France. It was French President Emmanuel Macron who, as Politico reported shortly before Christmas, worked on a Plan B based on joint debt among member states. Germany initially objected, arguing such a solution required unanimity and was therefore unrealistic. Yet, Macron secured Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s commitment not to obstruct it. The German delegation, however, remained confident on the summit day that its variant would prevail, noting De Wever seemed more open. Only during the joint dinner did it become clear: Plan B, Macron’s initiative with Italy’s contribution, would be adopted, not the Plan A favored and promoted by Merz. This outcome was predictable and demonstrated the limitations of the “Merz method.” Europe operates as a vast interest-balancing machine, requiring compromises among 27 member states. Six days before the summit, a diplomat from a major member state remarked, “It is Merz who caused a huge mess with his Financial Times article. He rushed a very complicated and far from mature issue.” The day before the summit, another diplomat told journalists, “When the 27 of us sit together, the Germans think the Belgians are the problem. While most others in the room think the Germans are the problem.” This sentiment stems from Germany’s long-standing opposition to debt mutualization. When Friedrich Merz presented the summit results at 3 AM, he effectively portrayed himself as the inventor of the solution. Berlin sought to emphasize that joint borrowing, as now agreed for financial aid to Ukraine, had been practiced numerous times. Macron, however, spoke of “Eurobonds” and a “premiere.” This was not the only point that clearly did not go according to the Chancellor’s plan. **Mercosur Postponement** The trade agreement with Mercosur states was expected to be signed by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brazil just before Christmas. German government representatives warned that if this deadline passed, the agreement would be definitively dead after 26 years of negotiations. French President Macron, however, highlighted farmers’ concerns, demanding further safety measures and at least the retention of the Common Agricultural Policy budget in the next multiannual financial framework. Germany made it clear that the agreement would be adopted, if necessary, even without France, requiring only a qualified majority of member states (55 percent of member states, 65 percent of the EU population). However, France was not the only country with reservations. Italy held the swing vote. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and persuaded him to discuss a postponement of a few weeks with his partners. Indeed, the postponement was granted. **Presenting Results That Are Not Yet Results** “Merz is very different from Merkel and Scholz,” says former Italian State Secretary for European Affairs Sandro Gozi. “Merkel was very tactical, preparing far in advance. Scholz’s actions were unreadable and often incomprehensible. Merz, on the other hand, presents results even though they are far from negotiated.” Political scientist Jeanette Süß from the Paris-based think tank Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) analyzed Merz’s European presence for a study. Compared to his predecessors, the Chancellor’s style is characterized by a strong emphasis on his will to lead. Similar to French President Macron, Merz often throws out ideas without having truly discussed them beforehand, even with his coalition partner, the SPD. The Chancellor quickly achieved an improvement in Franco-German relations. What the Chancellor might need to consider more, Süß suggests, is not to overshadow smaller member states and his own coalition partner too much. The next opportunity for this will arise at the latest when the EU negotiates its budget for the years 2028 to 2034.

Source: www.tagesschau.de