By: Ahmad Alromoh

 

 

Executive Summary

The presence of “a thing and its opposite” in religious texts has made the human relationship with religious belief subject to different calculations and to interpretive, explanatory, and hermeneutic dimensions—often led by a “believing” elite that produced “Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theology.” We thus face a sacred text that is “many-faced” (open to multiple readings), drifting away from the occasions of revelation and its historicity, and from its highest aim in virtue—since the mind can sometimes interpret it as it wishes, or as desire wishes, or as interest dictates.

The complex and unsettled relationship between religiosity and extremism has made it easy to employ religion and instrumentalize it within mechanisms of violence—reinforced by backward cultural, social, and economic interactions, authoritarian political structures, and rent-seeking alliances that redirect the religious text toward purposes unrelated to its original meaning.

Religious meaning loses its deepest content when it is reduced to one of its secondary facets or to one of its contexts—contexts that negate the integration of its value-system and distribute it through exaggerations between (a religion of peace / a religion of violence / a religion somewhere in between), as “Michel Onfray” expressed it. In general, religious extremism is committed for multiple reasons unrelated to religion itself, yet it leans on religion as a sacred power.

This is what we attempt to study through the following axes:

Axes

Introduction

Did the heavenly books incite extremism?

The sacred history of extremism!

Extremism and violence and their role in monopolizing truth

Drawing boundaries between the religious and the political

The entanglement of religion and politics in Islam!

Extremism between religiosity and politics

The clash of extremist fundamentalisms

Sources and references

Introduction

The emergence of religions constituted the founding of the human being of “original sin,” in contrast to the human being of “instincts,” and it strengthened the rivalry between the forces of good and evil according to the religious narrative of creation—until, in their maturation, they formed a moral truth by presenting the good will “Abel” as the counterpart to the evil will “Cain.” This established the transition from the bloody “human sacrifice” in which brother kills brother to the “animal sacrifice” in the “Abrahamic offering,” a relative shift away from the prevailing “violent custom” of the Ancient Near East (the firstborn son was considered the property of the deity), and a foundation for the act of “faith” and a new religious dimension in which God appears as a wholly distinct, unique existence who commands—and for whom everything is possible. (1)

Even the practice of punishment against dissenters or leniency toward them proceeds according to “human understanding,” which could not free itself from the contradictions surrounding a wavering morality between good as disposition and evil as impulse. Instead of striving to become “in the image and likeness of God,” people made God into a “personality” reflecting human impulses. And instead of founding faith upon ethics—since God is the supreme legislator of moral law—they made religion a self-interested, utilitarian ritual based on worship practices, performative supplications, and attention to appearances in monasteries, churches, and temples, for the sake of pleasing God.

Did the Heavenly Books Incite Extremism?

No one can deny what the three monotheistic religions provide in terms of indications of “God’s wrath,” and that part of “human faith” relied on fear of “God’s wrath” when violating His teachings. Yet that was not everything: the heavenly religions were not “calls to extremism.” What is mentioned in terms of violent verses has its counterpoints within the same religions, aiming to loosen the historical linkage between (sacred extremism / polytheistic plurality) in order to reach tolerance as an ethical choice and a law to be followed.

Thus Moses’ غضب (anger) at his people and his casting down of the “two tablets of the commandments” (4), and his calls to take up the sword and commands to kill “brother against brother and neighbor against neighbor” (5) to consolidate faith, are counterbalanced by the “commandments of the Lord” that Moses carried in the Book of Exodus: “You shall not kill. You shall not commit adultery. You shall not steal …” (6) as a covenant taken by “God” upon the Children of Israel. In other words, extremism in Judaism took shape through an “extremist religion confronting an extremist society.”

Its sharpness was moderated in Christianity without negating it or turning away from it, as Christ said: “Do not think that I have come to abolish … I have not come to abolish but to fulfill.” (Matthew 5:17). The sword remained a substitute for peace (7) and the whip a substitute for words (8), countered by Christ’s words: “Love your enemies. Bless those who curse you …” (9)

As for the Qur’an, the verses that mention killing, fighting, and their equivalents appear—many of them—in a historical frame in several surahs such as al-Tawbah and al-Anfal, while they are counterbalanced by the opening of the door of wisdom and mercy:
“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best.” (Qur’an 16:125)
“And We have not sent you except as a mercy to the worlds.” (Qur’an 21:107)

The presence of “a thing and its opposite” in reading religious texts has made the human relationship with religious belief subject to different calculations and interpretive dimensions—often led by a “believing” elite that produced “Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theology.” We thus face a sacred text that is “many-faced,” drifting away from the occasions of revelation and its historicity, and from its highest aim in virtue—since the mind can interpret it as it wishes, or as desire wishes, or as interest dictates.

The complex and unsettled relationship between religiosity and extremism has made it easy to employ religion and instrumentalize it within mechanisms of violence—reinforced by backward cultural, social, and economic interactions, authoritarian political structures, and rent-seeking alliances that redirect the religious text toward purposes unrelated to its original meaning. Religious meaning loses its deepest content when it is reduced to one of its secondary facets or to one of its contexts—contexts that negate the integration of its value-system and distribute it through exaggerations between (a religion of peace / a religion of violence / a religion somewhere in between), as “Michel Onfray” expressed it. (10)

In general, religious extremism is committed for multiple reasons unrelated to religion itself, yet it leans on religion as a sacred power. The sacred grants its representatives a prior mandate to monopolize authority, and sacred speech adds its own “symbolic” power to the power already present within the group, granting it legitimacy to employ extremism in its defense. (11)

This results from the religious person’s desire to connect to the sacred (religion), which in reality corresponds to the desire to establish an objective truth for oneself and not remain bound to a worldly time without meaning. Thus defending religion and the history of the religious community becomes a theoretical foundation for the production of extremism among many groups.

The Sacred History of Extremism!

The absence of “historical consciousness” as a “linear path” through which individuals and societies move—without accounting for the fact that the human being is “not the maker of history” but is governed by history through conditions and circumstances beyond his will—turns the present into a repetition of the past and a carrier of its problems and data. This is evident in the regression of time’s trajectory in many societies. (12)

Although the monotheistic religions do not consider time a closed loop, but rather regard temporal life as a beginning preparing for eternity and call toward a linear concept of history and progress toward the happiness of paradise, the traditional person does not weigh progress or the development of history and its events heavily. Only sacred time—the time of revelation, of founding a religion, and of forming the religious community—has meaning, based on an absolute belief that the power of a thing lies in its “origin”; if the origin equals “power,” it possesses value and meaning.

The earliest epochs of any “religious” call are considered sacred time with special value, insofar as history is seen as a divine manifestation whose events represent a higher will to be followed. Its clearest expressions in religious behavior appear in two cases: first, moving from remembrance to participation through reviving sacred occasions and events (such as the crucifixion of Christ or the commemoration of Ashura) to reinforce the sanctity of the religious historical narrative; second, linking present disasters to past tragedies and offering an interpretation that cannot be refuted despite changing times and realities. This is found among the followers of the three religions, which render historically-occurred extremism sacred and permissible to reenact again, thereby acquiring absolute religious value. (13)

To this day, behind every event (invasion, siege, battle) lies the will of “Yahweh” and His punishment—so that the “chosen” Jewish people do not deviate from their prescribed destiny and abandon their religious heritage entrusted to them by Moses. (14)

This continues in Christianity and adds to it: calamities are tests and discipline for deviation (e.g., the causes of Rome’s downfall in its distancing from God and closeness to Satan), which became the basis for a “philosophy of history” that Christianity had to construct beginning with Augustine (354–430 CE), who considered history a source for recognizing “deviant” factions opposed to church authority, such as the Donatists. (15) It also served to return heretics to Christian authenticity and to treat their divergence as a religious event in order to establish history as part of theology adopted later. (16)

History was thus employed for doctrinal ends and became a support for Christianity and its history. Likewise, much of the work of Muslim historians such as al-Tabari, al-Mas‘udi, and Ibn Khaldun reflects the transformation of historical events into “mythic/sacred” events, such as the Battle of Badr (where angels and Muslims participate in fighting the unbelievers of Quraysh). (17)

Sacred history formed the intellectual basis for political-religious Islamist currents seeking to restore the glory of the Islamic ummah, which brought to the surface the concept of Islamist religious terrorism. The “syndrome” of sanctifying history altered linear history and spread calls to return to origins under various slogans (“The first ones left nothing for the later ones”). Development thus becomes a march back toward what the first generations proclaimed, and some adopt the necessity of returning and adhering to the first generations’ understanding—separating oneself from “secular time” and inserting oneself into the larger sacred time by imitating ideal actions from religious history. (18)

This makes extremism in “mythologized” historical texts a foundation for various forms of sacred religious extremism and its manifestations, appearing within traditional societies and remaining intertwined with culture for long periods.

Extremism and Violence and Their Role in Monopolizing Truth

Many shared elements unite the three monotheistic religions regarding the human relationship with God, the shaping of spiritual and human ethical values through doing good and rejecting injustice, and holding the human being responsible for actions while God is responsible for judgment and reward. Yet this pure monotheism in the messages of all prophets did not establish a unifying common ground: the three religions diverged through claims of possessing absolute truth that cannot be false (the Jews as God’s chosen people; Christians as the salt of the earth; Christianity as the way, the truth, and the life; Muslims as the best nation brought forth for humankind).

The logic of monopolizing truth produced a dilemma for each of the three religions in terms of rapprochement and grounding shared values as a common ethical basis for humanity. Because truth is one and indivisible, it is impossible to accept any sharing of it by another religion. This leads to symbolic extremism and sometimes exclusionary or even eradicationist outlooks, as “religious” people often know the other religion through what they see and hear in popular culture—far from its sources—and judge it by their own claim to absolute truth and the other’s possession of falsehood. Religion thus becomes “non-debatable,” which departs from the epistemic truth that religion is among the most debatable matters, being connected to everyone and tied to an eternal destiny.

Historical experience shows that distorted religiosity passed through phases that produced sects, factions, and schools, each seeking to strip legitimacy and truth from other factions within the same religion. History witnessed bloody conflicts among followers of the same religion under the pretext of monopolizing truth and eliminating the deviant other. In Judaism, various religious groups emerged, including Reformists (“Haskalah”) aiming to adapt Jewish beliefs to lived reality, and “Haredim” who rely on inner interpretation (Kabbalah) of Jewish sacred texts. (20)

In Christianity, disagreements among Christians about the incarnation and divinity of Christ resulted in four major denominations (Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox, Protestant), in addition to independent Christian groups such as Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Messianic movements.

Islam, like other religions, split into denominations, schools, and sects. The divisions began immediately after the Prophet’s death and the dispute over succession, which laid the foundation for the greatest sectarian division in Islamic history between Sunni and Shi‘a—without establishing lasting principles for coexistence. What we see today in regions of sectarian “contact” such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen makes one think that the Saqifa of Banu Sa‘ida happened yesterday.

The struggle to possess truth constitutes the root basis for the emergence of religious extremism and its variations—whether as violence among the three major faith communities, or within smaller conflicts (Catholic–Protestant, Sunni–Shi‘a, Hindu–Muslim), culminating in extremist groups that operate “in the name of religion” as a maximal form of aggression with defensive justifications, regardless of how violence crystallizes in each religion.

Drawing Boundaries Between the Religious and the Political

Since the earliest human groupings, the alliance between temporal and spiritual authority was documented through the complementarity of (ruler and soothsayer). “Soothsayers/priests” established a kind of legislation to mold societies according to the ruler’s “vision,” using the weapon of prohibition (as moral authority). Religiosity extended its protection over political structure; political commands became a law that society was forbidden to overstep. With the rise of a pantheon, political and religious power merged: the king became a god and the god became a king. The use of extremism strengthened both authorities at once.

The appearance of religions reshaped the relationship between religion and politics. Judaism continued to merge religious and political authority as had been common before it; what is mentioned in the Torah does not distinguish between religion and politics, nor between legislation (the Ten Commandments) as foundations for building a new society and the mechanisms of preserving its continuity (power).

Violence was entrenched to stabilize both authorities together within a history founded on structural violence: political authority directs violence, while religious authority justifies it religiously. Religious authority receded under Roman rule (30 BCE–14 CE), and coexistence proceeded under the political vision (“Romans are blessed; others are barbarians”) who were not entitled to intervene in politics and governance. Yet the retreat of religious authority did not cancel its role; it maintained the weapon of prohibition, whose constraints left temple walls and imposed themselves on social, economic, and political life. This appears in the historical narrative of Jesus’ trial and the imposition of the “religious” judgment upon the Roman ruler Pilate. (21)

Judaism later returned to counting religion as infrastructure for politics, significantly legitimizing occupation to achieve political ends under religious cover and establishing the Jewish state as a political entity. Since the eruption of the “Jewish question” in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and efforts to resolve Jewish civil and legal status as a non-integrated minority through a “homeland” solution, the Zionist movement turned toward “Jewish nationalism” as a Torah-based and historical religious specificity, and pursued the establishment of a national homeland for Jews on the land of Palestine.

Christianity, by contrast, founded the possibility of separating the religious from the political: the Gospel did not directly intervene in political or social arrangements, nor did it specify a form of political organization. Yet Christ’s saying, “Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s” (22), established obedience to the ruler as obedience to God. This later reinforced the bond between religion and politics under Constantine (306–337 CE) and his aspiration to rule the “civilized world” (from Mediterranean shores to Iran), laying the foundation for a “Kingdom of Christ,” wherein the emperor is “overseer of the Church’s external affairs.”

The union of religion and politics (the Church and the Byzantine Empire) became the beginning of religious wars and the legitimacy of violence and persecution in the name of religion—among Christians and against other kingdoms—reaching its peak under Pope Urban and the Crusades (1096–1291) to liberate Eastern Christians from Seljuk oppression and to liberate holy places in Palestine, imposing God’s peace upon the world in response to popular apocalyptic expectations of the savior since 1095. Religious ideas fused with expansionist worldly aims, and armed “pilgrims” carried their crosses in search of wealth and fame. (23) “So that peace may prevail.”

This war left long-term political and economic effects, as well as social effects that persisted into modern times. It represented the launch of “religious wars,” and the bond between religion and politics and the sanctification of extremism continued until the end of Europe’s Middle Ages and the beginning of the Protestant Reformation under the German monk Martin Luther and his challenge to Church authority.

The Entanglement of Religion and Politics in Islam!

In Islam, the link between religion and politics became apparent through:

First: the invented idea of ḥākimiyya (divine sovereignty).
God alone possesses authority, and the laws contained in the Qur’an acquire sacredness and foundational status; thus, His rulings and commandments must be followed—despite differences in interpretation.

Second: the belief that the Prophet’s role aimed at founding a religious empire.
Hence Islamic thinkers derive political theories from the model of the Rightly Guided Caliphate. (24)

Islam did not constitute an actual legitimation of extremism. The Qur’an was revealed in response to disparate events and does not contain univocal teachings about violence in the texts of fighting and war. Scholars differed over whether such verses were temporary commands or fixed, eternal ones: some view combat and jihad as obligations; others cite verses of pardon and forgiveness. During early conquests, Muslims followed the Prophet’s policy of negotiation and did not impose Islam by force upon new subjects (People of the Book and Zoroastrians); they became dhimmis. ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab continued the Persian administrative system of Khosrow I regarding the treatment of non-Zoroastrians, and churches and Christian shrines were preserved. (25)

It is also noteworthy that the Qur’an did not indicate that Muslims’ mission is to conquer the world; however, the more militant currents elevated jihad hadiths as central texts and as the path to spreading religion—such as: “I have been commanded to fight the people until they testify that there is no god but God”—which became a basis for contemporary jihad movements.

Extremism Between Religiosity and Politics

Despite the “formal” separation between religion and politics in various historical phases and attempts to define roles, the process of spreading religions carried seeds of confrontation with the other in order to consolidate the new religion and form the religious community. In our present, where violence intensifies and the phrase “political/religious violence” is repeated, the question arises: can extremism be a religious demand? Is extremism religious by nature or political-religious?

Politics and religion together form the founding moment in which societies take shape and acquire their identity by drawing boundaries between inside and outside (enemies and friends, unbelievers and believers). Religion and politics thus become two faces of the same coin, differing in that politics refers to action/violence, while religion operates through symbols to preserve the community, consolidate its cohesion, and form its internal structure. Based on this “cooperation” between religion and politics, symbolic religious extremism turns into material violence—collectively produced, collectively promoted, and repeatedly invoked as a necessity for reshaping reality. (26)

Under a vision whose surface is sacredly religious and whose interior is the pursuit of ends unrelated to religion, politics triumphs in the name of religion and harnesses it as an instrument of its extremism. This can be traced in the trajectory of Islamist groups and their clerics, beginning with the Muslim Brotherhood and the ideas of Hasan al-Banna, as they moved from social preaching to authoritarian political domination and shifted from representing an enlightened Islam to founding jihadist groups.

With the contemporary extremism whose resonance has grown since September 11 and which is among the most frequent and widespread phenomena of recent decades, sparing no place in the world, we move toward its most salient points, including:

Differences in international policies in dealing with extremism: some consider it “evil,” while others regard it as a tool of war and find in it an interest—an instrument to impose control at times and a mechanism to fight enemies at other times.

A tendency to discuss extremism in search of justification rather than solution, meaning a blindness to the fact that justifications—whatever their form—do not find meaning without the continuous invocation of an ideal state model (the Rightly Guided Caliphate) and the recovery of the founding of the first Islamic community as a paradigm of good, where confronting the other and violence against him becomes a justification. (27)

A clear flight from discussing extremism rationally, which prevents dismantling it intellectually and instrumentally. The danger of Islamist extremism stems from making human beings sacrificial offerings to a matrix of doctrinal conceptions, within dense membership and well-funded organizations, grounded in allegedly pure religious motives.

Contemporary extremism has moved from the myth of the “sacred past” to the myth of the “sacred future” in establishing a “global Islamic ummah”—from what is to what is possible—promoted as an attainable truth to the ignorant who seek the safety of the sacred past within an unknown future. This shift represents a return of primitive extremism through advanced means.

The ideologies of extremist religious organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS share common traits in their religious formation, goals (re-founding the first Islamic community), and strategy (establishing an Islamic caliphate), adopting violence as the means to achieve their ends. Their solutions therefore require an enlightening intellectual movement that redefines religion—its role and function—in the age of technology. Ultimately, the solutions to extremism lie in the hands of Muslims themselves in determining which Islam they want; religion in its entirety exists for the human being and his elevation, not for killing him.

The Clash of Extremist Fundamentalisms

Despite humanity’s development and major leaps—even reaching discussions of dividing or allocating outer space—religion remains a motor that can be exploited and turned into an instrument of war. Yet matters do not stop there in a world that has crossed the threshold of globalization: globalized extremism in its various matrices—from economic and political violence to cultural collision—has fostered the growth of religious and nationalist fundamentalist movements that drew on identity politics to wage a fierce struggle to impose their existence and preserve difference and otherness, appearing as counter-violence that rejects domination and dissolution. (28)

Even in a superpower like the United States, the twentieth century saw a notable rise of the evangelical current—the “most conservative and fundamentalist”—within Protestant denominations. It believes in the literal inerrancy of the Bible, especially apocalyptic end-times narratives, which led in 1978 (Guyana, South America) to the death of (918) followers of the preacher Jim Jones at his direction, dubbed “revolutionary suicide” to escape the evils of the world. The return of Christ the savior and the battle of Armageddon (Tel Megiddo) became a point of convergence between Torah and Gospel; the “new evangelicals” embraced its inevitability. This idea was not limited to clergy: President Ronald Reagan said in 1980, “We may be the generation that sees the battle of Armageddon,” and preacher Billy Graham supported President George Bush in the Iraq war as part of a “salvation” war.

Europe, despite the separation of religion and state, has not been free of the rise of Christian nationalist movements, which became more aggressive with waves of Islamist extremism and “Islamophobia,” framing Islam as their enemy—such as the PEGIDA movement in Germany (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident”), neo-Nazis, and other populist movements that gained strength across Europe and achieved record vote shares.

The impasse of extremism accompanying human progress is not limited to the violence of “Islamic” extremist fundamentalist movements. Many religious milieus and political ideologies internalized extremism and violence against the other (in West and East). Nazi nationalism ignited violence in World War II and the Holocaust against Jews. The ideology of the Jewish far right advanced the slogan “a land without a people for a people without a land.” Communist ideology and the clash between the Soviet East and the American West in Afghanistan produced al-Qaeda as a resistance movement before it exceeded the goals drawn by its patrons, becoming an independent fundamentalist force that turned against its makers and declared its sacred war on their very existence. The ideology of the Christian right blessed the invasion of Iraq and inspired President George W. Bush, who called it a “crusade.”

It is a closed circle of extremism: terrorist operations committed by some Islamist militants placed religion as an offering on various battlefields, while Western radicalization toward Muslims—placing them all in a single basket labeled discrimination on religious grounds and associating religion with terrorism—produced a West that is more extreme and less accepting of the other, turning the whole world into a victim of a fireball ignited by extremists East and West who serve one another despite different theaters of combat.

Sources and References

1- PDF The Myth of the Eternal Return, Mircea Eliade, trans. Nihad Khiyata—Dar Tlass, Damascus, 1st ed. 1987 (pp. 192–194)
2- PDF Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Immanuel Kant, trans. Fathi al-Miskini—Dar Jadawel, Kuwait, 1st ed. 2012 (p. 37)
4- (Exodus 32:19)
5- (Exodus 32:27)
6- (Exodus 20:13–14–15–16)
7- (Matthew 10:34)
8- (John 2:13–14–15–16)
9- (Matthew 5:44–47)
10- “Michel Onfray and Islam on a French Tailor-Made Scale,” Mohsen al-Mohammadi—Asharq Al-Awsat
https://aawsat.com/…/الفيلسوف-ميشال-أونفري-والإسلام-على-المقا
…
11- PDF Symbolic Violence, Pierre Bourdieu, trans. Nazir Jahil—Arab Cultural Center, Beirut, 1st ed. 1994 (pp. 6–25–36)
12- “A Rescue System Coming from the Past,” Hawazen Khodaj—Tahawolat Magazine, Issue (21), 2015
www.tahawolat.net/ArticleDetails.aspx?Id=6758

13- Previous reference: The Myth of the Eternal Return (pp. 185–187)
14- (1 Samuel 12:10)
15- Wikipedia
https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/دوناتية

16- “The Theological Interpretation of History in Augustine: An Approach to Augustine’s Philosophy of History,” Prof. Dr. Amer Abdul-Zaid al-Wa’ili—Al-Mothaqaf
www.almothaqaf.com/index.php/derasat/60720.html

17- PDF Sacred Violence and Sex in Islamic Mythology, Turki Ali Rabi‘u—Arab Cultural Center, 2nd ed. 1995 (p. 11)
18- PDF Searching for History and Meaning in Religion, Mircea Eliade, trans. Dr. Saud al-Mawla—Arab Organization for Translation, 1st ed. 2007 (p. 35)
19- “Ancient and Contemporary Jewish Religious Sects,” Abdul-Wahhab Muhammad al-Jabouri—Al-Bidaya
https://andalusiat.com/…/الفرق-الدينية-اليهودية-القديمة-والمع-2

20- (Jesus was tried by the High Council of priests and the death penalty was approved for blasphemy; it was imposed through a parallel political charge under Roman law: Jesus’ claim to kingship—“Everyone who makes himself a king opposes Caesar” (John 19:2)—Wikipedia)
https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/يسوع

21- (Mark 12:12–17)
22- Previous reference: Fields of Blood—Religion and the History of Violence (pp. 241–261)
23- “The Religious and the Political in Judaism and Islam,” Samira Bouchlouh—Aljazeera.net
https://www.aljazeera.net/…/الديني-والسياسي-في-اليهودية-والإسلام

24- Previous reference: Fields of Blood and the History of Violence (pp. 285–286–287–290)
25- PDF “Theory of Interpretation: Discourse and Surplus of Meaning,” Paul Ricoeur, trans. Saeed al-Ghanimi—Arab Cultural Center, Casablanca 2006, Morocco (p. 103)
26- “The Debate of Religions on Violence and Terrorism,” Abdul-Azim Hammad
https://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate…id
..
27- “Fundamentalist Identities in an Age of Clash,” Prof. Dr. Ali As‘ad Watfa—Annabaa Network
https://annabaa.org/news/maqalat/writeres/aliasaadwatfa.htm

28- “Extremism: The Unifying Fireball,” Hawazen Khodaj—Al-Arab al-Londoniya